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Children’s  joint  action  and  advance  planning  skills  are  both  undergoing  development  during
the preschool  years,  but  little is  known  about  how  joint  action  contexts  inﬂuence  children’s
advance  planning.  In the ﬁrst experiment,  three-year-olds  (N  = 32) were better  at planning
ahead for  a  task  in  an  individual  compared  to  a joint  condition  when  playing  with  a  social
partner.  A second  experiment  indicated  that three-year-olds  (N = 32)  were  as able  to plan
in advance  with  a non-social  machine  as when  playing  alone,  suggesting  that  the  effects
found  in the ﬁrst  experiment  were  not  a function  of  different  timing  or cognitive  demands
between  individual  and  joint  conditions,  but were  unique  to  the  social  context.
©  2016  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  Inc. This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
As soon as infants are born, they are immersed into a social world. They are engaged in social interactions almost imme-
diately, and their social environment plays an important role in their development across a variety of domains. The types
of social interactions in which children are engaged and the extent of the child’s participation in the interactions varies
across development. As newborns, infants are engaged in dyadic interactions with their caregivers and other adults that are
largely adult-led. Within the ﬁrst few years of life, however, infants begin to actively engage in triadic interactions (i.e., joint
attention) that are essential to language learning and imitative interactions that are central to skill and cultural learning.
Collaborative interactions, in which children and their social partners work together to achieve a common goal, emerge
later in development and are critical to the uniquely human capacity for higher-order cognition and achievements such
as innovation. Although joint actions are beneﬁcial to achieving complex goals, they may  also come at a cost due to the
difﬁculty of incorporating another person into one’s task. Given the important role that social interactions play in cognitive
development, it is important to identify both the beneﬁts (e.g., assistance with carrying out actions) and pitfalls (e.g., the
need to take a partner’s plans and actions into account) of these interactions. In this research, we investigate the inﬂuence
of social context on children’s advance planning.
2. Joint action developmentSebanz, Bekkering, and Knoblich (2006) deﬁne joint action as “any form of social interaction whereby two or more
individuals coordinate their actions in space and time to bring about a change in the environment” (p. 70). They suggest that
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E-mail addresses: GersonS@cardiff.ac.uk (S.A. Gerson), h.bekkering@donders.ru.nl (H. Bekkering), s.hunnius@donders.ru.nl (S. Hunnius).
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uccessful joint actions require prediction of one another’s actions, shared representations of goals by both social partners,
nd integration of the predicted effects of the actions. Without sensitive social partners who  adapt their actions to the child’s
nd scaffold the children’s planning, children struggle to efﬁciently and successfully carry out joint actions in the ﬁrst few
ears of life (e.g., Brownell, 2011; Gräfenhain, Behne, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009; Hunnius, Bekkering, & Cillessen, 2009;
eyer, Bekkering, Paulus, & Hunnius, 2010). For example, at 2.5 years of age, children are not efﬁcient at playing simple
urn-taking games with a neutral joint action partner and often make errors in which they perform an action during their
artner’s turn (Meyer et al., 2010).
. Planning development
One skill that is both crucial to joint actions and important in and of itself is advance planning. Planning which ingredient
o hand to your friend next is crucial to carrying out an ongoing baking activity with one’s partner. Even when acting alone,
lanning one’s actions in advance is important. If a person baking alone adds ﬂour before eggs to a batter, this could disrupt
is or her individual action plan. In tasks that involve advance planning, individuals must take future states into consideration
hen initially engaging in an activity. Planning can be carried out either individually or within a joint action context. A recent
tudy with adults (Meyer, van der Wel, & Hunnius, 2013) measured advance planning of actions that could be performed
lone or with another person. In this task, advance planning was not critical to achieve the goal, but planning the initial
tep of the task in advance with regard for the future step allowed subjects to carry out the task more easily and efﬁciently.
ithout explicitly being told to do so, participants learned to initiate actions based on predictions about the subsequent
teps (i.e., planned ahead) after they gained ﬁrsthand experience acting in the task. This was  true in both individual and joint
ontexts, suggesting that participants were similarly able to use their experience acting alone to predict either their own or
dapt to a partner’s actions and carry out their actions accordingly. In a developmental adaptation of this task, 3.5-year-old
hildren, but not 2.5- or three-year-olds, were signiﬁcantly above chance in planning their actions in order to accommodate
 partner’s action (Meyer, van der Wel, & Hunnius, 2016). Even at ﬁve years of age, however, children were still quite variable
n their accommodation and, though above chance levels, were not consistently planning with regards for their partners.
A similar advance planning task that can be applied in both social and non-social contexts involves choosing an item
hat will be needed for a future task. Suddendorf and colleagues (Suddendorf, Nielsen, & von Gehlen, 2011) found that four-
ear-olds, but not three-year-olds, correctly anticipated an item that would be needed in a future setting. An experiment
hat examined this type of planning in a joint context was conducted by Warneken and colleagues (Warneken, Steinwender,
amann, & Tomasello, 2014). They found that ﬁve-year-olds were better than three-year-olds at planning which of two
ools to act on so that the complementary tool would be available for a social partner to complete a collaborative goal.
hus, ﬁve-year-olds can plan in advance in certain joint contexts. This work did not, however, contrast joint planning with
ndividual planning, leaving open the question of the role of social context on advance planning.
In some cases, an interactive social partner beneﬁts children’s planning. Radziszewska and Rogoff (1988) used imaginary
rrand planning to assess 9- and 10-year-old children’s ability to plan the shortest route to retrieve all the items from
tores on a list. They found that children who engaged in collaborative planning of the errands with an adult partner were
ubsequently more effective at planning on their own  than children who engaged with a peer initially. This is consistent with
he general notion ﬁrst presented by Vygotsky (1978) that sensitive and skilled partners can scaffold children’s activities
uring interactions in order to promote skill acquisition in the child. To be sure, engaging in joint actions with an adult
artner has positive consequences on children’s planning in the long-term (Bibok, Carpendale, & Müller, 2009; Duran &
auvain, 1993; Gauvain & Rogoff, 1989; Gauvain, 1992; Hammond, Müller, Carpendale, Bibok, & Liebermann-Finestone,
012). The question of how social partners inﬂuence action sequences while being carried out remains an open question.
. How do interaction partners inﬂuence planning?
As discussed above, in certain circumstances, children can plan within joint contexts. They perform at above chance levels
n choosing a tool or action that will facilitate a partner’s action when they are older than three years (Meyer et al., 2016;
arneken et al., 2014). As of yet, however, the effect of the presence or absence of a social partner has only been investigated
ith respect to subsequent planning following scaffolded interactions (e.g., Radziszewska & Rogoff, 1988). Measuring the
ffect of a neutral partner (i.e., a partner who does not help the child in the moment) on advance planning within an action
equence is important because planning during ongoing interactions has implications for the smooth maintenance of social
nteractions and joint task completion. As described above, if a person is passing a cooking partner ingredients to be added
o a batter, it is critical that the receiver plans his or her actions around the action being carried out by the partner. If a
ooking partner is expecting to be handed eggs but is handed ﬂour, his or her plans might have to be adjusted to take this
nto account.
In the current research, we investigate advance planning during a game that could either be played alone or in a turn-
aking sequence with a partner. In order to present a neutral partner who  would not facilitate or hinder the child’s actions,
he partner acted in a predictable, uniform manner throughout the task. Although turn-taking tasks are minimally joint in
hat they do not necessarily require precise coordination in time and space, they share many of the features of joint actions,
ncluding shared goals and interaction space. Previous research indicates that young children represent turn-taking tasks
s shared, even when they’re not told to take into account the partner’s actions (e.g., Milward, Kita, & Apperly, 2014; Saby,
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Bouquet, & Marshall, 2014). This controlled setting (turn-taking with a neutral partner) will act as a ﬁrst step toward better
understanding more complex interactions with potentially less predictable or reliable peers. Three-year-olds were tested
because, as described above, both their planning and joint action abilities are emerging at this age (e.g., Gauvain, 1992;
Hamann, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2012), allowing us to examine the malleability of planning during individual versus joint
actions.
5. Current experiments
To examine the interplay between joint actions and advance planning, we created a color-matching game in which the
child was required to plan ahead in order to succeed in the game. If he or she did not plan ahead, the child had the chance
to modify the action during a subsequent step of the game. The chance to modify the action allowed a control measure to
ensure that all children understood the goal of the game. All children played this game both alone and in alternating turns
with a joint partner, a handpuppet named Kip (Dutch for chicken). The use of puppets as social partners and mentalistic
agents is well-established with this age-group (e.g., Bartsch, Wade, & Estes, 2011; Rakoczy, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2008)
and allowed us to control the partner’s actions without giving the impression that the partner was  a human adult who might
scaffold the child’s actions. Across a variety of paradigms, children treat puppets as mentalistic agents who have beliefs
and are expected to act in socially normative manners (Beier, Over, & Carpenter, 2014; Rakoczy, 2008; Rakoczy et al., 2008;
Schmidt, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2012). Research by Bartsch et al. (2011) tested the possibility that puppets were seen as
more artiﬁcial than human adults and found no differences in three-year-old children’s attribution of beliefs to puppets
or humans. We  examined differences between children’s accuracy in advance planning during the individual versus joint
conditions.
If collaboration provides advantages for children’s advance planning during an ongoing interaction, as it has been shown
to do for subsequent planning (e.g., Gauvain & Rogoff, 1989), then children should perform better in the joint than in
the individual condition. This would suggest that the presence of a social partner boosts cognitive skills such as planning
regardless of the pedagogical or functional role of the partner. If, however, ongoing social interactions disrupt children’s
performance due to the additional demands of incorporating a social partner (who, in this case, is not helping scaffold the
child’s behavior), children’s advance planning should be better in the individual condition than the joint condition. This
would be in accord with theories suggesting that joint actions sometimes disrupt processing due to the extra demands
of representing a social partner’s actions (see, for example, Milward et al., 2014; Sebanz & Knoblich, 2009). We  test this
hypothesis in Experiment 1.
6. Experiment 1
6.1. Method
6.1.1. Participants
Thirty-two three-year-olds (mean age = 37.16 months; range = 36 months to 37.3 months) were included in the ﬁnal data
set for this study (15 females). All children were recruited from a database of families who  volunteered to participate in
child studies. Children were from a mid-sized European metropolitan area and were largely Caucasian and middle-class. An
additional 10 children participated but were not included due to equipment malfunction (n = 2), experimenter error (n = 2),
not completing all trials (n = 3), or lack of learning of the rules of the game (as deﬁned by repeatedly and persistently stating
that mismatches were “correct”) or refusal to play with Kip (n = 3).
6.1.2. Stimuli and procedure
Each trial consisted of a set of four balls, four cups, and a clear, plastic tube that held the balls. There were always two
cups of one color (e.g., green) and two cups of another color (e.g., yellow). Each cup could only ﬁt one ball. In all but the ﬁrst
training trial, there were two balls of one color (e.g., green), one ball of a second color (e.g., yellow), and one ball that was
multicolored (e.g., half green and half yellow). The overall goal of the game was for the child (together with his or her co-actor
in the joint condition) to place all four balls in matching buckets (solid colored balls could only go in the directly matching
bucket, whereas multicolored balls could go in either bucket). The tube was created to dispense the balls one at a time in
a particular order while still allowing participants to see the colors of the upcoming balls (see Fig. 1). The multi-colored
ball always came out of the tube in the second position, and the three solid-colored balls were pseudorandomly distributed
in the ﬁrst, third, and fourth positions. Except in the demonstration trial, different color combinations (consisting of red,
light blue, dark blue, green, and yellow) were used across trials so as to minimize learning speciﬁc rules about colors and
to keep the children’s attention. In joint play trials, the experimenter wore a hand puppet of a chicken (called “Kip”). The
experimenter used a different voice so as to differentiate herself from the puppet so that the child did not expect Kip to
scaffold his or her actions.6.1.2.1. Training. Children were taught how the game worked via a set of training trials. First, the experimenter placed a set
of four solid-colored balls (e.g., brown and black) into matching cups. This short phase was  to teach children that balls had to
go into matching cups and that only one ball could ﬁt in each cup. Next, one of the solid balls (the one in the second position)
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aig. 1. In both experiments, each trial involved three-solid colored balls, a multicolored ball, and two cups in each of two colors. In Experiment 1, the balls
ere  in a manually controlled tube (A). In Experiment 2, they were in a similar tube that allowed machine-control of the bucket placement (B).
as replaced with a multi-colored ball. When the experimenter extracted the multi-colored ball, she showed the child that
t could go in either the brown or the black cup. After showing them this, she always left the ball in the inappropriate cup
n terms of meeting the end goal. That is, if there were two brown balls in the tube, the multi-colored ball would be placed
n a brown cup (and vice-versa if there were two  black balls). This “mistake” was made in order to show participants the
mportance of considering the upcoming balls in the tube (i.e., planning ahead) and to indicate how errors could be modiﬁed.
he experimenter then placed a black and brown arrow in front of the cup to indicate which cup held the multi-colored ball.
fter the incorrect placement of the multi-colored ball, the experimenter showed the child that one of the remaining solid-
olored balls no longer had an appropriate cup in which to be placed. She talked to the child about how this could possibly
e ﬁxed and reminded them about the meaning of the arrow and hinted about a possible solution: “Do you remember what
his arrow means? This means that the multi-colored ball is in this cup. And where can the multi-colored ball go?” She then
xtracted the multi-colored ball and placed it in the opposite colored cup. She moved the arrow to the new cup and then
laced the solid-colored ball in the appropriate cup. After having done this, she reminded the child of how the problem had
een modiﬁed.
Two training trials followed this demonstration in which the experimenter scaffolded the child’s actions. These two
rials consisted of two different sets of colored balls, randomly assigned. During these trials, the experimenter handed the
articipant each of the balls and asked him or her to place them in the matching cup. She frequently reminded the child that
ll the balls had to “ﬁt” in the cups (and pointed to the balls in the tube). If the child encountered a solid-colored ball that
ad no matching cup, the experimenter ﬁrst gave him or her time to try to modify the action themselves. Then she gave the
articipant a series of hints, allowing time for the child to recognize the solution between each hint. As in the demonstration
rial, hints increased in detail, ranging from asking what the arrow meant to reminding the child that the multi-colored ball
ould go in either cup. If the child still did not respond to the hints, the experimenter moved the mixed ball and demonstrated
he solution. In this way, the experimenter always ensured that the balls were matched with an appropriate cup at the end
f the trial. After these two trials, the experimenter told the child he or she was ready to play without help. Individual or
oint play trials then began. All children participated in both conditions (order counterbalanced between participants).
.1.2.2. Individual play. The individual condition consisted of six trials. In each of these trials, the child retrieved each ball
rom the tube, one at a time, and placed it into a cup. The experimenter did not participate except to ensure that the child
id not retrieve the following ball before ﬁrst placing the one in his or her hand into a cup. If the child encountered a
roblem (i.e., a solid-colored ball without a matching cup), the experimenter did not interfere unless the child looked to
he experimenter for help. If the child expressed uncertainty and enquired for help, the experimenter gave the same hints
s during the training trial, again giving the child time to modify the action between each hint. After all of the balls were
laced in cups, the experimenter asked the child if they were all correct (regardless of whether or not they were). If the child
ealized then that there was an error, the experimenter helped (as above) if the child enquired.
.1.2.3. Joint play. At the beginning of joint trials, a small hand puppet was introduced to the child. The child was told that
he puppet was named Kip and that Kip wanted to play with him or her and they could take turns (see Fig. 2). The joint
lay session consisted of nine trials. In the ﬁrst, fourth, and seventh trial, Kip let the child place the ﬁrst (and third) ball and
ip placed the second (multi-colored) and fourth ball. Kip always placed the multi-colored ball in the cup that allowed all
orthcoming balls to be placed correctly. In the other six trials, Kip placed the ﬁrst and third balls and the child placed the
econd and fourth balls. This ensured that the number of trials for which the child had to plan (by placing the multi-colored
all correctly) was matched across the individual and joint conditions. If the child incorrectly placed the multi-colored ball
nd realized this error when later attempting to place a solid-colored ball, the experimenter followed the same procedure
s in the individual play trials as far as waiting for the child to enquire in order to give any hints. Any hints given were
124 S.A. Gerson et al. / Cognitive Development 40 (2016) 120–131Fig. 2. In Experiment 1 (A), children alternated turns with Kip during joint action conditions. In Experiment 2 (B), children alternated turns with the
machine, which moved the appropriate cup under the tube before the ball was released.
expressed by the experimenter rather than by Kip. If Kip had to place the solid-colored ball that had no matching cup, she
would knock on the full cups and say “uh oh—this ball can’t go in this one” and would ask for the child’s help. If the child did
not immediately modify the action, the experimenter followed the same pattern for giving hints as in other trials.
6.1.3. Coding
6.1.3.1. Planning ahead and modifying. The focal question in this study concerned children’s ability to proactively plan where
to place the multi-colored ball so that all following balls could ﬁt in matching cups. For each trial in which the child placed
the multi-colored ball (six individual play and six joint play trials), a trained coder watched an ofﬂine video of each session
and judged whether the child placed the multi-colored ball in the correct cup (for the end goal achievement) without any
hints from the experimenter before the following ball was  retrieved from the tube. We  refer to this behavior as advance
planning.
A control question was whether children would modify actions if their initial ball placement was incorrect. For this
measure, coders judged whether the child removed the mixed ball (in the case of an initial placement error) and placed it in
a correct cup. If so, the coder noted whether the child carried out this action with or without needing the assistance of hints
from the experimenter. To be clear, if the experimenter gave any hints, the child was scored as incorrect in both planning
and modifying. Advance planning and modifying were both, therefore, unrelated to frequency of hints because hints were
only given after the child failed to plan or modify on their own  and if and when the child looked to the experimenter for
help following an attempted modiﬁcation.
The dependent measure for both advance planning and modifying was the proportion of trials within each condition for
which the child’s action was correct. That is, for advance planning, the proportion of trials on which the child placed the
mixed ball correctly initially was calculated by a trained coder blind to the hypotheses of the experiment. For the modifying
stage, we assessed both the proportion of incorrectly planned trials that were then modiﬁed without a hint (proportion
modiﬁed: [trials modiﬁed]/[total trials − trials modiﬁed in advance]) and the proportion of trials that were correct following
both planning and modifying (proportion planned or modiﬁed: [trials planned in advance + trials modiﬁed]/[total trials]). A
second trained coder coded 25% of the videos and agreed on 99% of trials (к  > 0.8, p < 0.001). Because proportion scores are
not normally distributed, we report both parametric and non-parametric statistics for analyses using these scores.
6.1.3.2. Ball order. In addition to counterbalancing the order of conditions across children, we  also pseudorandomly assigned
different orders of ball presentation within each trial and across participants. It is possible that children found some orders
of presentation more difﬁcult than others (e.g., A(mixed)AB and A(mixed)BA might be easier than B(mixed)AA). In order to
account for this possibility, we coded each trial type according to these orders (e.g., A(mixed)AB was ‘0′ and B(mixed)AA
was ‘1′) and created an average score of “ball order” for each individual in order to ensure that these factors did not differ
between conditions or drive any possible results.
6.1.3.3. Timing and attention. In addition to coding children’s behavior on a gross level, we also did a more ﬁne-grained
analysis of children’s actions throughout the game. In particular, a trained coder used a software program (ELAN:
http://tla.mpi.nl/tools/tla-tools/elan/; Wittenberg, Brugman, Russel, Klassmann, & Sloetjes, 2006) to measure (frame-by-
frame) children’s attention to (i.e., number of seconds gazing toward) the experimenter (deﬁned as the experimenter’s face)
and Kip (in the joint condition) during each trial. Two  children’s videos were unable to be coded because of video errors.
A reliability coder coded approximately 25% of the videos and the number of seconds attending to each aspect was  highly
correlated between the two coders (r = 0.96).
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nig. 3. Children were better at planning in the individual than joint condition in Experiment 1 (*p = 0.03). They were above chance in the individual condition
f  Experiment 1 and in both conditions of Experiment 2 (*p < 0.05).
.2. Results
.2.1. Planning and modifying results
An initial paired-samples t-test examined whether children differed in their advance planning when playing alone (indi-
idual condition) or with Kip (joint condition). This revealed that children were better at planning when playing alone
han with Kip, t(31) = 2.24, p = 0.03, Cohen’s d = 0.57 (see Fig. 3). A non-parametric, Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test showed a
imilar pattern, Z = 2.08, p = 0.04. The proportion of trials for which children successfully planned was  greater than chance
evels in the individual condition, t(31) = 3.95, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 1.42 (M = 0.61, SEM = 0.03), but not in the joint condition,
(31) = 0.10, p = 0.92, Cohen’s d = 0.04 (M = 0.50, SEM = 0.04). As a complementary non-parametric measure, chi square tests
ere conducted for each condition with number of children performing above, at, or below chance entered as variables.
n the individual condition, a signiﬁcant difference emerged, 2(2) = 10.75, p = 0.005 (16 above, 14 at chance, 2 below). The
ifference in number of children above, at, or below chance did not differ in the joint condition, 2(2) = 1.19, p = 0.55 (11
bove, 8 at chance, 13 below).
For the trials during which children did not successfully plan, we  assessed the proportion of this subset of trials that
hildren successfully modiﬁed their errors without any hints (proportion modiﬁed). The proportion modiﬁed did not differ
etween the individual and joint conditions, t(30) = 0.42, p = 0.68, cohen’s d = 0.09 (Wilcoxon Signed Rank: Z = 0.41, p = 0.68).
verall, following planning and the opportunity to modify their actions (proportion planned or modiﬁed), children were highly
uccessful in both the individual and joint conditions (mean proportion of trials in which the child had correctly placed all
alls [without hints] by the end of the trial: M = 0.85, SEM = 0.03, and M = 0.85, SEM = 0.03, respectively).
We then assessed whether children were learning across the six trials within each condition and whether any potential
hanges differed between conditions. A Repeated-Measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with trial portion (ﬁrst or second
alf) and condition (individual or joint) as repeated measures revealed no main effect of trial portion (F(1,30) = 2.47, p = 0.13,
2
p = 0.08) and no interaction between trial portion and condition (F(1,30) = 1.43, p = 0.24, ŋ2p = 0.04), but a signiﬁcant main
ffect of condition (F(1,30) = 4.70, p = 0.04, ŋ2p = 0.14).
Given the increased planning performance in the individual condition, one might expect that children who  engaged in
he individual condition prior to the joint condition would perform better during the joint condition. In contrast to this
otion, when condition order (i.e., whether the child participated in the individual or joint condition ﬁrst) was  added as a
etween-subjects (counterbalanced) factor to a repeated-measures ANOVA, the order in which children engaged in the two
onditions did not inﬂuence their advance planning (main effects and interactions: ps > 0.85) and both children who  initially
ngaged in the individual condition and those who initially engaged in the joint condition showed evidence of planning
n the individual (one-sample t-test from chance: p = 0.013 and 0.016, respectively), but not the joint (p = 0.86 and 0.97,
espectively), condition. Thus, there was no transfer of learning from the individual condition to the joint condition.
In order to verify that presentation order was  unrelated to children’s success in planning within either condition, we
xamined any potential correlation between ball order score and advance planning in either condition (ps > 0.11). This lack
f effect suggests that no ball presentation order was more difﬁcult for children than another. We  also assured that the
umber of these different kinds of trials did not differ between conditions (p = 0.74). Therefore, ball presentation order had
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no inﬂuence on children’s planning either within or between conditions. Finally, for the approximately 15% of trials on which
children may  have received hints following unsuccessful planning and modifying (i.e., the trials on which children did not
advance plan or modify correctly without a hint; 1.0–0.85; see mean planned or modiﬁed above), we  assessed whether
providing a hint on one trial inﬂuenced the child’s advanced planning in the subsequent trial. We  found that children were
equally likely to correctly plan in advance (n = 15 trials in each condition) as to not plan correctly (n = 13 trials in each
condition) on trials following hints.
6.2.2. Timing and attention results
We assessed children’s attention to (seconds gazing toward) Kip and the experimenter in order to ensure that children
were acting as though Kip, rather than the experimenter, was  the social partner in the joint condition. In accordance with
this hypothesis, children were rated as more attentive to Kip than to the experimenter during joint action trials, t(25) = 9.29,
p < 0.001. Amount of time looking to the experimenter and Kip were both unrelated to planning in the joint condition,
rs < 0.30, ps > 0.14, and amount of time looking to the experimenter was  unrelated to planning in the individual condition,
r = −0.08, p = 0.71.
6.3. Discussion
In this experiment, children were signiﬁcantly better at planning ahead when they played alone than when they took
turns playing with a social partner. That is, when playing alone, they were more likely to take into account the colors of
the remaining balls when initially choosing where to place the mixed ball. When playing with a partner, children’s initial
placement of the mixed ball was seemingly random (i.e., the placement was  correct about half the time). The fact that
children did not perform as well in this case suggests that sharing the task with a partner made it more difﬁcult for the
children to plan the substeps of the task in advance.
When children did not plan correctly and encountered a proceeding ball for which there was  no matching cup, they
were equally competent at modifying this action without any hints regardless of whether they were playing alone or with
a partner. The fact that children could and did modify the action without hints from the experimenter in both conditions
suggests that children understood the goal of the task and what actions were necessary in order to achieve this goal. Thus, it
was not a lack of understanding of the task that prevented children from planning appropriately during the joint condition.
This is impressive given the complexity of the task carried out by the children.
These ﬁndings raise the question of why children’s planning differed between individual and joint conditions. As con-
ﬁrmed by our analyses, the order in which the conditions were encountered did not play a signiﬁcant role in children’s
planning in either condition; nor did the different presentations of ball order inﬂuence children’s planning. What was it,
then, that made acting with Kip more difﬁcult for planning actions?
On one account, low-level factors such as cognitive load could have interfered with children’s planning. The presence of
the partner added complexity to the scene, possibly drawing cognitive resources away from the task at hand and causing
the child to lose focus. Baron (1986) has suggested that the presence of others causes shifts in cognitive processing. This
might be particularly true during early development when attentional control is still developing (Rueda, Posner, & Rothbart,
2005). The lack of relation between attention to Kip and planning during the joint condition suggests that simple attention
to Kip was not driving individual differences in the deﬁcits seen in planning. Still, overall, children did have more to process
during the joint condition than the individual condition, which may  have hindered performance on a group level.
For instance, children may  have struggled to maintain attentional control because of the timing differences between the
two task conditions. That is, children could play continuously during the individual condition of the task but were required
to pause their own play while their partner acted during the joint condition. It is possible that it was  not simply the presence
of the other, but the fact that the child’s play was interrupted that made planning more difﬁcult. The act of ﬂexibly adapting
to the timing, rather than controlling the timing oneself, could have also decreased children’s focus and hindered advance
planning.
Alternatively, the mere presence of a social partner, rather than the pauses in play or attention, may  have undermined
children’s planning. Did the children truly see Kip as a “social partner” and, if so, what was the consequence of this? Anecdotal
evidence and attentional analyses suggest that children viewed the puppet, Kip, as a social partner, separate from the identity
of the experimenter. Several children were initially shy when Kip was  ﬁrst introduced; others were highly engaged with Kip
and talked with her or gave her a high ﬁve or a hug after successful trials. Children also looked more toward Kip than to the
experimenter during joint condition trials. Thus, consistent with past research suggesting that children can treat puppets as
social agents (e.g., Bartsch et al., 2011), it seems that children in this case viewed Kip as social. Given that children viewed
Kip as a social partner, the social nature of the interaction may  have disrupted the children’s planning.
When performing a task alone, we can create a plan and carry out the task without interruption. When jointly acting
with another person, however, we need to take the other’s actions into account. According to Sebanz and Knoblich (2009),
intentional coordination of actions with another person requires representing both one’s own  and one’s partner’s roles in
the task. They suggest that adults engaged in joint actions predict a partner’s actions in a joint action task by representing the
action of a partner and one’s own actions in a functionally equivalent way. The incorporation of the partner’s task typically
leads to a decrease in performance (e.g., slowed reaction time) relative to when carrying out the same task without a partner
present or with a non-social machine (Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2003; Stenzel et al., 2014). In fact, incorporating a partner’s
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ask “affects one’s own action planning and performance even when there is no need to take the other’s part into account at
ll” (p. 357; Sebanz et al., 2003). In accord with this, Knoblich and Jordan (2003) observed that groups, relative to individuals,
ace additional demands that are harder to overcome when planning needs to be extended into the future. Information about
thers’ actions is a necessary condition for groups to effectively learn to extend their plans. Recent developmental research
uggests that, at least by four years of age, children similarly co-represent a partner’s task during joint actions (Milward
t al., 2014; Saby et al., 2014).
Sebanz et al. (2003) suggest that the presence of others inﬂuences task performance. They argue that “social facilitation
ffects are not moderated by the speciﬁc actions carried out by others” (p. 12). Instead, they suggest that the presence
f another person improves performance on simple tasks but impairs performance on more complex tasks. The current
ask provides a setting in which this perspective may  come to bear in that the planning carried out by children at three
ears is complex for their developmental stage and is still malleable at this age. As noted by Rogoff, Gauvain, and Gardner
1987), when ﬁrst emerging, a lack of advance planning may  not indicate a lack of skill, “but may  instead [reﬂect] difﬁculty
mplementing it appropriately in the many occasions in which the task is hard for them” (p.312).
In a second experiment, we contrasted the above two  perspectives to resolve whether attention and timing factors (e.g.,
xecutive function) or social factors (e.g., shared representations) better explained why children’s planning suffered in the
oint condition from Experiment 1. Rather than playing the matching game with a social partner, in Experiment 2, children
nstead alternated turns with a machine that similarly created cognitive demands and interruptions in play. In contrast to
he puppet, however, machines are not seen as social and infants and young children do not see their actions as intentional or
oal-directed (Meltzoff, 1995; Moriguchi, Matsunaka, Itakura, & Hiraki, 2012; Woodward, 1998). If the cognitive demands of
nteracting with the partner or pauses during play decreased children’s advance planning in Experiment 1, children should
e equally poor at planning ahead when playing with a machine. If, however, children’s difﬁculty in the joint context of
xperiment 1 was uniquely the result of playing with a social partner, children playing with the machine should perform
ust as well as when playing alone.
. Experiment 2
.1. Method
.1.1. Participants
Thirty-two three-year-olds (mean age = 36.19 months; range = 35.5 months–36.67 months) who  had not participated in
xperiment 1 were included in the ﬁnal data set for this study (14 females). All children were recruited from a database of
amilies who volunteered to participate in child studies. An additional six children participated but were not included due
o equipment malfunction (n = 1), not completing all trials (n = 4), or lack of learning of the rules of the game (n = 1).
.1.2. Stimuli, procedure, and coding
The stimuli and procedure in Experiment 2 were identical to those in Experiment 1 with the following exceptions: In
oth individual and joint trials, the balls came out of a tube that was part of a machine that appeared to move on its own
n a mechanical motion (see Fig. 2B). The experimenter used a control box that was  out of the child’s sight to release balls
rom the tube and to move the correct cup under the tube during the joint trials for which it was  the machine’s turn. Instead
f introducing the child to Kip at the beginning of the joint trials, the experimenter told the child that he or she would be
laying with a machine and had to take turns. As Kip did in Experiment 1, the machine always placed the multi-colored ball
n the correct cup during its turn. If the machine was to place a solid colored ball into a cup that was not available, it would
ove back and forth between the full cups (to indicate hesitation and to best match the knocking of balls that Kip did in
xperiment 1) and then would pause and wait for the child to respond. If the child did not modify the action immediately,
he machine would drop the ball into an incorrect bucket (because the machine could not vocalize the problem as Kip did
n Experiment 1). Coding of planning and modifying was  identical to that of Experiment 1 and a reliability coder who  coded
5% of the videos agreed with the original coder on 98% of trials (к  > 0.8, p < 0.001). Coding of attention was not conducted
or this experiment as there was no social partner and it was not possible to differentiate looks to the machine and the balls
r cups because they were within contact at all times (and balls were actually held within the machine).
.2. Results
As in Experiment 1, we ﬁrst assessed whether children differed in their advance planning when playing alone (individual
ondition) or with the machine (joint condition). This revealed that children did not differ in their planning in the two
onditions, t(31) = 0.29, p = 0.78, Cohen’s d = 0.07 (see Fig. 3; Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Z = 0.44, p = 0.66). The proportion
f trials for which children successfully planned was  greater than chance levels in the individual condition, t(31) = 2.45,
 = 0.02, Cohen’s d = 0.88 (M = 0.58, SEM = 0.03), and in the joint condition, t(31) = 2.83, p = 0.008, Cohen’s d = 1.02 (M = 0.60,
EM = 0.03). As a complementary non-parametric measure, chi square tests were conducted for each condition with number
f children performing above, at, or below chance entered as variables. Signiﬁcant differences emerged in both the individual,
2(2) = 6.44, p = 0.04 (15 above, 13 at chance, 4 below). and the joint conditions, 2(2) = 10.19, p = 0.006 (19 above, 8 at chance,
 below).
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For the trials during which children did not successfully plan, we  again assessed proportion modiﬁed and proportion
planned or modiﬁed. The proportion modiﬁed did not differ between the individual and joint conditions, t(27) = 0.16, p = 0.88,
Cohen’s d = 0.03 (Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Z = 0.17, p = 0.86). Overall, children were highly successful in both the individual
and joint conditions in proportion planned or modiﬁed (mean proportion of trials in which the child had correctly placed
all balls [without hints] by the end of the trial (M = 0.85, SEM = 0.03, and M = 0.85, SEM = 0.04, respectively).
A repeated measures ANOVA with trial portion and condition as repeated measures showed no effect of trial portion
(F(1,31) = 0.37, p = 0.35), condition (F(1,31) = 0.04, p = 0.84), or interaction between these two  factors (F(1,31) = 0.24, p = 0.63).
We also conﬁrmed that the different types of ball order presentation did not differ between conditions, p = 0.88, and that
ball presentation order was unrelated to planning in either condition, ps > 0.32. Further, we conﬁrmed that the ball order
presentation did not differ between experiments 1 and 2 for either condition, ps > 0.16. Additionally, we found that the
number of trials directly following potential hints that children planned correctly (n = 11 and 10 in the individual and joint
conditions, respectively) and did not plan correctly (n = 9 and 13, respectively) did not differ systematically.
7.2.1. Results across Experiments 1 and 2
Finally, in order to compare advance planning between conditions, we  conducted a repeated measures ANOVA with
condition as a repeated measure and experiment as a between subjects measure. This revealed no main effects (condition:
F(1,62) = 1.81, p = 0.18, ŋ2p = 0.03; experiment: F(1,62) = 1.08, p = 0.30, ŋ2p = 0.02) but a marginal interaction between condi-
tion and experiment, F(1,62) = 3.10, p = 0.08, ŋ2p = 0.05. Following up on the estimated marginal means of this interaction
revealed that participants’ advanced planning did not differ between experiments for the individual condition (estimated
marginal mean = 0.02 [SEM = 0.04], p = 0.57). The difference between experiments was marginal for the joint condition (esti-
mated marginal mean = 0.09 [SEM = 0.05], p = 0.07) such that individuals in the ﬁrst experiment (puppet) were worse at
advance planning in the joint condition than participants in the second experiment (machine).
7.3. Discussion
In Experiment 2, the cognitive and inhibitory demands of the joint condition with the machine were matched to the
cognitive and inhibitory demands required for interaction with the puppet in Experiment 1 in terms of the pauses between
turns for the child and the novelty of the puppet or machine during the joint phase. Nevertheless, children in Experiment 2
performed equally well in planning ahead in the individual and joint conditions when the joint “partner” was  a non-social
machine. The fact that children’s advance planning was  signiﬁcantly above chance level in the joint condition and did not
differ from performance in the individual condition suggests that the pauses between turns and necessary inhibitory control
was not a signiﬁcant source of difﬁculty for the participants. The marginal difference between joint conditions in the two
experiments, however, indicates that this should be interpreted with caution.
Further, the new context (relative to training) and the added novelty of the machine did not disrupt children’s proactive
problem-solving. Anecdotally, the majority of children were intrigued by the machine and were interested in uncovering the
source of the movement (and sometimes even tried to push the machine themselves). Despite the avid attention children
paid to the novel contraption, they were able to overcome this distraction in order to plan ahead. The matching of these
factors across experiments and differential advance planning of children in the joint condition indicates that, rather than
cognitive limitations such as attention switching or inhibition, the social context that the puppet provided speciﬁcally
challenged children’s advance planning in Experiment 1. The possible reasons for the unique detriment in advance planning
when playing with a social partner are expanded upon in the General Discussion.
8. General discussion
The current ﬁndings shed new light on the difﬁculties encountered when ﬁrst attempting to incorporate predictions of a
partner’s actions with one’s own advance planning. They suggest that proactive planning for two  individuals, even when they
share a common goal, is more difﬁcult than planning ahead solely for oneself. They further highlight differences between
interactions with a non-social versus a social partner.
8.1. Implications for joint action development
The unique challenge of planning actions with a social partner is consistent with prior research indicating that taking
another individual into account when carrying out joint actions adds complexity beyond that added by the novelty of a non-
social agent. Sebanz and Knoblich (2009) have pointed out that planning in joint actions may  be more difﬁcult than during
individual actions because joint actions involve integrating two  action plans – one’s own  and one’s partner’s. Given that
planning of others’ actions might happen in a functionally equivalent manner to planning one’s own actions (as described
by the simulation account, e.g., Wilson & Knoblich, 2005), it is understandable that the effort of separating plans for the
other from those of your own might hinder optimal performance. As noted in the introduction, recent evidence suggests
that children, like adults, represent a partner’s actions when in a social interaction (Milward et al., 2014; Saby et al., 2014). In
some instances, a social partner’s actions interfere or alter the effects of one’s own  actions. These instances make planning
one’s own actions more difﬁcult and stress the importance of creating complimentary actions in joint action (Bekkering
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t al., 2009). In the current research, the partner’s actions should not have interfered with the child’s in any way  (as the
artner always acted correctly and there was no need to coordinate actions on a ﬁne timescale). An interesting avenue of
uture research will be to explore how less predictable or reliable social partners inﬂuence children’s advance planning and
odiﬁcations.
The joint action conditions in these experiments were minimally joint in that they involved a turn-taking task during
hich the partner always performed correctly. Turn-taking reduces timing and coordination demands that are common to
ther joint action tasks. Still, the difﬁculty in planning ahead for the children in the joint condition of Experiment 1 indicates
hat this minimal interaction made the task more difﬁcult than playing alone. These ﬁndings suggest that the added difﬁculty
f engaging in joint actions with social partners is robust early in development, in that errors can be seen in minimally joint
ontexts and without the need to time and coordinate actions carefully. The effects likely become more subtle with further
evelopment (e.g., evident in reaction time differences for particularly complex tasks). Future research should consider the
ifferential inﬂuences of more or less complex interactions with social and non-social partners across development.
.2. Developmental links between planning, social cognition, and social interaction
Ontologically, developments in advance planning skills and increased participation in joint actions emerge around the
ame period (De la Ossa & Gauvain, 2001; McCormack & Atance, 2011; Meyer et al., 2010). More broadly, the similar timing
n development of several executive functioning (EF) skills (including planning, inhibitory control, and working memory)
nd social cognition (e.g., theory of mind) have been thoroughly studied (refs?). One reason many researchers are interested
n the similar timing of EF skill emergence and improvements in social cognition is because of the bidirectional relations
etween these domains and their effects on later social functioning. For example, greater EF skills have been associated with
etter theory of mind reasoning in children during development of both of these skills (e.g., Carlson, Mandell, & Williams,
004; Frye, Zelazo, & Palfai, 1995; Hala, Hug, & Henderson, 2003; Hughes, 1998; Müller, Liebermann-Finestone, Carpendale,
ammond, & Bibok, 2012), and individual differences in performance on theory of mind tasks, in turn, are predictive of later
ocial competence (e.g., Diesendruck & Ben-Eliyahu, 2006; Lalonde & Chandler, 1995; Razza & Blair, 2009). Riggs, Jahromi,
azza, Dilworth-Bart, and Mueller, (2006) suggest that EF likely has direct, mediational and moderational inﬂuences on
ocial functioning. As shown in this research, social context can have an inﬂuence on executive functioning (i.e., planning)
uring an ongoing interaction, thus supporting the possible mediational role of social interactions on relations between
ocial cognition and executive functioning.
Interestingly, children responded differently to social and non-social partners, and the incorporation of another social
gent into the task was uniquely challenging. The challenge of incorporating social cognitive skills into joint action tasks
ikely inﬂuences the efﬁciency and effectiveness of carrying out joint actions throughout development. In fact, in a review
f joint action development, Brownell (2011, p. 193) suggested that “a key mechanism underlying the dramatic changes
n joint action over the second year of life is the ability to reﬂect consciously on oneself and one’s behavior and volition
nd correspondingly, on the behavior, goals, and intentions of others”. As noted in the introduction, engagement in joint
ctions with a social partner requires a variety of social cognitive abilities. The prerequisite abilities of prediction, shared
epresentation, and integration emerge at different timepoints in development. Children of the age in the current research
3 years) have the ability to view a partner as an intentional agent (see Woodward et al., 2009, for a review), predict another
erson’s actions (e.g., Falck-Ytter, Gredebäck, & von Hofsten, 2006), and plan ahead when carrying out their own  actions
individual conditions in this research). They understand and predict others’ actions speciﬁcally for social agents (e.g., hands,
haracters, puppets, biological motion) but not for non-agentive objects (e.g., claws, machines, mechanical movement; e.g.,
alck-Ytter et al., 2006; Meltzoff, 1995; Woodward, 1998). Meyer and colleagues (Meyer, Bekkering, Haartsen, Stapel, &
unnius, 2015) recently found direct evidence that individual differences in 2.5-year-olds’ ability to accurately anticipate
thers’ actions in an eye-tracking task was directly related to effectively carrying out joint actions in a turn-taking task. This
uggests that the ability to predict actions accurately outside of a joint action context (in place to varying degrees in the
hird year of life) plays a role in a child’s ability to adapt to a partner within a joint action.
Although it is likely that three-year-old children could make predictions about a partner’s actions, the extent to which they
ntegrated and differentiated their own and their partner’s plans cannot be deﬁned in the current experiment. Recognition
f a shared representation between oneself and one’s partner and differentiation between oneself and one’s partner is likely
 function of full-ﬂedged theory of mind that is not solidiﬁed until the fourth or ﬁfth year of life. Consistent with this notion,
ilward and colleagues (Milward et al., 2014) recently found that children four years and older represented a partner’s task
uring a joint activity, but younger children did not. It is possible, however, that children’s developing understanding of
thers’ mental states at this age could interfere with processing by adding an increased cognitive load when interacting with
 social partner. That is, attempting to identify a social partner’s mental states, even if not fully formed or accurate, could
nterfere with other task demands. This possibility presents an alternative to the hypothesis put forth by Sebanz and Knoblich
2009), though not orthogonal or in complete contradiction, in that an accurate and complete internal representation of the
artner’s action would not be necessary in order to interfere with processing in joint actions. The current research cannot
ifferentiate these possibilities, but future research should investigate how changes in theory of mind inﬂuence the way in
hich children represent and interpret a partner’s actions and alter how they interact with that partner.
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8.3. Limitations and future directions
The relative complexity of the planning task in this research may  have provided the ideal setting in which to examine
differences across social contexts at this age. It is likely that, given a less demanding task (or this task at an older age),
children would have performed similarly in the individual and joint conditions in Experiment 1. On the other hand, a more
difﬁcult task may  have created ﬂoor effects in which children would not have performed at above chance levels in either
condition. The variability in advance planning across conditions in this research was  likely due to an interplay between task
difﬁculty and developmental period. Whether and how individual versus joint planning differs in different developmental
periods and at different levels of task complexity should be explored further.
The speciﬁc context and knowledge about the individual with which the child is engaged may  alter how children interact
with the joint action partner. In the current experiment, it is unknown whether children viewed the puppet as a similarly
skilled peer, an adult who was not helpful in scaffolding, or a play companion who was  pretending to be naïve. Better deﬁning
how children view the interaction partner and how different partners alter their behavior will help deﬁne the constraints
and generalizability of the current ﬁndings. For example, whether performance differs when playing with parents, who
may scaffold their actions, or with peers, who are less predictable in their actions, is an interesting avenue of future work.
In the current research, we do not know whether children perceived Kip as more or less predictable than the machine in
Experiment 2.
One possible explanation for the current ﬁndings is that children perceived the social agent (Kip) as less predictable
than the machine and thus found the presence of the social other more distracting during their own  actions. Although we
controlled the actual predictability of Kip’s and the machine’s actions, humans are typically less systematic and consistent
in their responses than are machines, and this knowledge could have accordingly inﬂuenced children’s interactions with
Kip. Another alternative is presented by the on-line simulation account (e.g., Wilson & Knoblich, 2005), which proposes that
it is more difﬁcult to separate one’s own action plans from a human agent compared to a non-human agent because of the
functionally equivalent format in the former, but not the latter, case. A better understanding of how actions of others are
represented and inﬂuence advance planning within joint action development is critical for further exploration of potential
educational consequences and atypical developmental patterns.
References
Baron, R. S. (1986). Distraction-conﬂict theory: Progress and problems. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 19, 1–39.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60211-7
Bartsch, K., Wade, C. E., & Estes, D. (2011). Children’s attention to others’ beliefs during persuasion: Improvised and selected arguments to puppets and
people. Social Development, 20,  316–333.
Beier, J. S., Over, H., & Carpenter, M.  (2014). Young children help others to achieve their social goals. Developmental Psychology, 50,  934.
Bekkering, H., De Bruijn, E. R., Cuijpers, R. H., Newman-Norlund, R., Van Schie, H. T., & Meulenbroek, R. (2009). Joint action: Neurocognitive mechanisms
supporting human interaction. Topics in Cognitive Science, 1, 340–352.
Bibok, M.  B., Carpendale, J. I., & Müller, U. (2009). Parental scaffolding and the development of executive function. New Directions for Child and Adolescent
Development,  123, 17–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/cd.233
Brownell, C. A. (2011). Early developments in joint action. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2, 193–211. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13164-011-0056-1
Carlson, S. M.,  Mandell, D. J., & Williams, L. (2004). Executive function and theory of mind: Stability and prediction from ages 2 to 3. Developmental
Psychology,  40,  1105.
De la Ossa, J. L., & Gauvain, M.  (2001). Joint attention by mothers and children while using plans. International Journal of Behavioral Development, 25,
176–183. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01650250042000168
Diesendruck, G., & Ben-Eliyahu, A. (2006). The relationships among social cognition, peer acceptance, and social behavior in Israeli kindergarteners.
International Journal of Behavioral Development, 30,  137–147.
Duran, R. T., & Gauvain, M.  (1993). The role of age versus expertise in peer collaboration during joint planning. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology,  55,
227–242. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jecp.1993.1013
Falck-Ytter, T., Gredebäck, G., & von Hofsten, C. (2006). Infants predict other people’s action goals. Nature Neuroscience, 9, 878–879.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nn1729
Frye, D., Zelazo, P. D., & Palfai, T. (1995). Theory of mind and rule-based reasoning. Cognitive Development, 10,  483–527.
Gauvain, M.,  & Rogoff, B. (1989). Collaborative problem solving and children’s planning skills. Developmental Psychology, 25,  139–151.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037//0012-1649.25.1.139
Gauvain, M.  (1992). Social inﬂuences on the development of planning in advance and during action. International Journal of Behavioral Development, 15,
377–398.  http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/016502549201500306
Gräfenhain, M.,  Behne, T., Carpenter, M.,  & Tomasello, M.  (2009). Young children’s understanding of joint commitments. Developmental Psychology, 45,
1430–1443. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0016122
Hala, S., Hug, S., & Henderson, A. (2003). Executive function and false-belief understanding in preschool children: Two tasks are harder than one. Journal of
Cognition and Development, 4, 275–298.
Hamann, K., Warneken, F., & Tomasello, M.  (2012). Children’s developing commitments to joint goals. Child Development, 83,  137–145.
Hammond, S. I., Müller, U., Carpendale, J. I. M.,  Bibok, M.  B., & Liebermann-Finestone, D. P. (2012). The effects of parental scaffolding on preschoolers’
executive function. Developmental Psychology, 48,  271–281. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0025519
Hughes, C. (1998). Executive function in preschoolers: Links with theory of mind and verbal ability. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 16,
233–253.
Hunnius, S., Bekkering, H., & Cillessen, A. H. N. (2009). The association between intention understanding and peer cooperation in toddlers. European
Journal of Developmental Science, 3, 368–388.
Knoblich, G., & Jordan, J. S. (2003). Action coordination in groups and individuals: Learning anticipatory control. Journal of Experimental Psychology:Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 29,  1006–1016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0278-7393.29.5.1006
Lalonde, C. E., & Chandler, M. J. (1995). False belief understanding goes to school: On the social-emotional consequences of coming early or late to a ﬁrst
theory of mind. Cognition & Emotion, 9, 167–185.
Müller, U., Liebermann-Finestone, D. P., Carpendale, J. I., Hammond, S. I., & Bibok, M.  B. (2012). Knowing minds, controlling actions: The developmental
relations between theory of mind and executive function from 2 to 4 years of age. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 111, 331–348.
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
V
W
W
W
W
WS.A. Gerson et al. / Cognitive Development 40 (2016) 120–131 131
cCormack, T., & Atance, C. M.  (2011). Planning in young children: A review and synthesis. Developmental Review, 31, 1–31.
eltzoff, A. N. (1995). Understanding the intentions of others: Re-enactment of intended acts by 18-month-old children. Developmental Psychology, 31,
838.
eyer, M.,  Bekkering, H., Paulus, M.,  & Hunnius, S. (2010). Joint action coordination in 2½-and 3-year-old children. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 4,
1–7.  http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2010.00220
eyer, M.,  van der Wel, R. P. R. D., & Hunnius, S. (2013). Higher-order planning for individual and joint object manipulations. Experimental Brain Research,
225,  579–588. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00221-012-3398-8
eyer, M., Bekkering, H., Haartsen, R., Stapel, J. C., & Hunnius, S. (2015). The role of action prediction and inhibitory control for joint action coordination in
toddlers. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 139, 203–220.
eyer, M.,  van der Wel, R. P., & Hunnius, S. (2016). Planning my actions to accommodate yours: Joint action development during early childhood.
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 371, 20150371.
ilward, S. J., Kita, S., & Apperly, I. A. (2014). The development of co-representation effects in a joint task: Do children represent a co-actor? Cognition,
132,  269–279.
origuchi, Y., Matsunaka, R., Itakura, S., & Hiraki, K. (2012). Observed human actions, and not mechanical actions, induce searching errors in infants. Child
Development Research, 1–5.
adziszewska, B., & Rogoff, B. (1988). Inﬂuence of adult and peer collaborators on children’s planning skills. Developmental Psychology, 24,  840–848.
akoczy, H., Warneken, F., & Tomasello, M. (2008). The sources of normativity: Young children’s awareness of the normative structure of games.
Developmental Psychology, 44,  875–881.
akoczy, H. (2008). Taking ﬁction seriously: Young children understand the normative structure of joint pretence games. Developmental Psychology, 44,
1195–1201.
azza, R. A., & Blair, C. (2009). Associations among false-belief understanding, executive function, and social competence: A longitudinal analysis. Journal
of  Applied Developmental Psychology, 30,  332–343.
iggs, N. R., Jahromi, L. B., Razza, R. P., Dillworth-Bart, J. E., & Mueller, U. (2006). Executive function and the promotion of social-emotional competence.
Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology, 27,  300–309.
ogoff, B., Gauvain, M.,  & Gardner, W.  (1987). The development of children’s skills in adjusting plans to circumstances. In S. L. Friedman, E. K. Scholnick, &
R.  R. Cocking (Eds.), Blueprints for thinking: The role of planning in cognitive development (1987) (pp. 303–320). New York, NY, US: Cambridge University
Press.
ueda, M.  R., Posner, M.  I., & Rothbart, M.  K. (2005). The development of executive attention: Contributions to the emergence of self-regulation.
Developmental Neuropsychology, 28,  573–594.
aby, J. N., Bouquet, C. A., & Marshall, P. J. (2014). Young children co-represent a partner’s task: Evidence for a joint Simon effect in ﬁve-year-olds.
Cognitive Development, 32,  38–45.
chmidt, M.  F., Rakoczy, H., & Tomasello, M. (2012). Young children enforce social norms selectively depending on the violator’s group afﬁliation.
Cognition,  124, 325–333.
ebanz, N., & Knoblich, G. (2009). Prediction in joint action: What, when, and where. Topics in Cognitive Science, 1, 353–367.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-8765.2009.01024.x
ebanz, N., Knoblich, G., & Prinz, W.  (2003). Representing others’ actions: Just like one’s own? Cognition, 88,  B11–B21.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0010-0277(03)00043-X
ebanz, N., Bekkering, H., & Knoblich, G. (2006). Joint action: Bodies and minds moving together. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10, 70–76.
tenzel, A., Dolk, T., Colzato, L. S., & Sellaro, R. (2014). The joint Simon effect depends on perceived agency, but not intentionality, of the alternative action.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8, 1–10.
uddendorf, T., Nielsen, M.,  & Von Gehlen, R. (2011). Children’s capacity to remember a novel problem and to secure its future solution. Developmental
Science,  14,  26–33.
ygotsky, L. S. (1978). Mind in society: the development of higher mental process. Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press.
arneken, F., Steinwender, J., Hamann, K., & Tomasello, M.  (2014). Young children’s planning in a collaborative problem-solving task. Cognitive
Development,  31,  48–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2014.02.003
ilson, M.,  & Knoblich, G. (2005). The case for motor involvement in perceiving conspeciﬁcs. Psychological Bulletin, 131, 460–473.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.131.3.460ittenburg, P., Brugman, H., Russel, A., Klassmann, A., & Sloetjes, H. (2006, May). Elan: a professional framework for multimodality research. In
Proceedings of LREC (Vol. 2006, p. 5th).
oodward, A. L. (1998). Infants selectively encode the goal object of an actor’s reach. Cognition, 69, 1–34.
oodward, A. L., Sommerville, J. A., Gerson, S., Henderson, A. M., & Buresh, J. (2009). The emergence of intention attribution in infancy. Psychology of
learning and motivation,  51,  187–222.
